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User-Friendly Licensing for a
User-Generated World: The Future of
the Video-Content Market
ABSTRACT

A picture may say a thousand words, but in today's artistic
culture, video is the true king. User-generated remix and mashup
videos have become a central way for people to communicate their
ideas, to be a part of popular culture, and to bring life to their own
artistic visions. Digital technology and the rise of user-generated
Internet platforms have enabled professionals and amateurs alike to
participate in the creation of web videos, which often incorporate
popular content. But this has led to a growing tension between
amateur sampling artists and copyright rightsholders. The current
video-content- licensing scheme requires individually negotiated
contracts for authorized use of copyrighted material, but amateur
artists frequently lack the bargaining power and understanding of
copyright law to comply with licensing requirements.
This Note argues that amateur remix and mashup videos have
become a staple in our artistic culture, and the video-licensing system
Some have
needs to evolve to accommodate artists of all levels.
advocated for a "sharingeconomy approach" to copyright, in which
rightsholders voluntarily agree to collaborate in "peer-to-peer"
While that approach accommodates the needs of
marketplaces.
amateur artists, it does not fully satisfy content owners' interest in
monetary compensation for the licensing of their original works. In
contrast, a collectively managed taxation model, with rates that
distinguish between professional and amateur artists, would balance
the interests of content owners and sampling artists. It would remove
the need for individually negotiated licenses, enable amateur artists to
easily experiment with new art forms, and create a viable video-content
market. The web video is here to stay, so it is time to turn copyright
infringement into profit.
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In 1921, T.S. Eliot remarked: "Immature poets imitate; mature
poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it
While
into something better, or at least something different."'
emulation may be a standard practice among artists, Eliot
distinguished between those who merely copy and those who
ultimately find a voice of their own. 2 When done skillfully, borrowing
from other artists can result in more than just an echo; it can give rise
to something new. 3 By mining existing art for material, creators
remain connected with our shared culture while producing works that
speak to society in a novel way. 4 In the context of film, for example,
1.
T.S. ELIOT, Philip Massinger, in THE SACRED WOOD: ESSAYS ON POETRY AND
CRITICISM 123, 125 (Methuen & Co. 1960) (1920) (critiquing the way in which poet Phillip
Massinger borrowed from the works of William Shakespeare).
2.
See id.
RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO (Eyesteelfilm & National Film Board of Canada, 2009)
3.
(presenting a "remix manifesto" based on four premises, the first of which is the idea that
"[c]ulture always builds on the past"); see ELIOT, supra note 1 ("The good poet welds his theft into
a whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that from which it was torn.").
4.
See supra note 3.
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producers often use modernized retellings of old stories to relate to
new audiences: Clueless and Bridget Jones'Diary,loosely based on the
stories of Jane Austen, taught Generation Y lessons of class structure
and female empowerment in contemporary language,5 while 10 Things
I Hate About You and Baz Luhrman's Romeo + Juliet invited a new
generation to experience Shakespeare in the context of modern
society. 6
The "recycling of old culture" is a deep-rooted tradition, and
digital technology, such as video-editing software, has now made it
even easier for both amateur and professional artists to revise or reuse
existing artistic works.7 Internet platforms, like YouTube and other
user-generated video websites, allow individuals to share these new
creations online; this ultimately gives everyone with Internet access
the potential for fame and the ability to participate in culture.8 People
who were formerly consumers of art and entertainment now have the
digital tools to be entertainers themselves.9 This has led to a shift in
values toward a more democratic artistic culture. 10 Young people, in
particular, have come to expect that, no matter who you are or what
your background is, you have a right to join in the fun. 1 ' Today's
reality is that, when a twelve-year-old posts a homemade video to

5.

Jane Austen in Popular Culture, JANE AUSTEN MULTI-GENRE PROJECT, https://sites.

google.com/alweberschool.org/jane-austenlhome/j ane-austen-in-pop-culture (last visited Oct. 14,
2012).
6.
Jessica Scheibach, Top 15 Films Inspired by Shakespeare, IMDB, http://www.imdb.
com/list/bVECJ6CCiCc (last updated Aug. 5, 2011).
7.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID

ECONOMY 14 (2008) (quoting Gregg Gillis of the one-man band Girl Talk that "[w]e're living in
this remix culture"); Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix
Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2008) ("[R]emix works are created by taking digital
snippets from various sources and combining them to create a new work."); Eduardo Navas,
Regressive & Reflexive Mashups in Sampling Culture, in MASHUP CULTURES 157, 159 (Stefan
Sonvilla-Weiss ed., 2010) (defining "remix" as "the activity of taking samples from pre-existing
materials to combine them into new forms"); Code of Best Practices Comm., Code of Best
Practices in Fair Use for Online Video, CTR. FOR Soc. MEDIA, 2 (June 2008), http://www.
centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/online-best-practices in-fair-use.pdf.
Yalda T. Uhls & Patricia M. Greenfield, The Rise of Fame: An Historical Content
8.
Analysis, CYBERPSYCHOLOGY: J. PSYCHOSOCIAL RES. ON CYBERSPACE (July 2011), http://www.

cyberpsychology.eulview.php?cisloclanku=2011061601.
See, e.g., Matthew Mirapaul, Why Just Listen to Pop When You Can Mix Your Own,
9.
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/20/arts/arts-online-why-just-listento-pop-when-you-can-mix-your-own. html (describing a website that compiled hundreds of
amateur remixes of a pop artist).
10.
See id.
11.
See Uhls & Greenfield, supra note 8 (analyzing a study that indicated the high
value younger people place on achieving fame and celebrity).
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YouTube, he just might become a star; this was, in fact, how record
executives discovered pop music sensation Justin Bieber. 12
The growing desire for fame, particularly among members of
Generation Y, has made the creation of user-generated web videos
very popular. 13 Viral videos have become a common way for ordinary
people to respond to, and be a part of, popular culture and maybe even
advance their own entertainment careers. 14 In addition to producing
purely original material, many web users create videos that build on
existing copyrighted material to create novel meaning.15 These videos,
which can sometimes take the form of mashups or remixes, often
feature original footage combined with famous content.16
Referred to as "sampling" in the music context, this practice is
like creating a collage-piecing together disparate elements to make
something new.17 A musician, for instance, might pull samples from
jazz, funk, and psychedelic records to create a completely different
sound from any one of these genres alone. 18 In the context of
user-generated videos, websites such as YouTube are alive with
artistic works that combine fragments of popular culture into
something unexpected; for example, one video artist created a mashup
of clips of President Barack Obama's speeches, which together form
the lyrics to the pop song "Call Me Maybe" by Carly Rae Jepsen. 19
Another video mashup brings together footage of Michael Jackson
from the 1980s, Britney Spears from the 1990s, and Taylor Swift from
the 2000s to make one music video that spans the decades. 20 It used
to be that a picture was worth a thousand words, but today, video is
king.

Desiree Adib, Pop Star Justin Bieber Is on the Brink of Superstardom, ABC NEWS
12.
(Nov. 14, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Weekend/teen-pop-star-justin-bieber-discoveredyoutube/story?id=9068403.
13.
See Navas, supra note 7, at 171; John Izzo, A Culture of Fame, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 19, 2007, 5:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-izzo/a-culture-of-fame_b_73366.
html (discussing a survey in which 1/3 of high school students said their goal was to be famous);
Sharon Jayson, Generation Y's Goal? Wealth and Fame, USA TODAY (Jan. 10, 2007), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.cominews/nation/2007-01-09-gen-y-cover-x.htm?csp=1.
14.
Code of Best Practices Comm., supra note 7.
15.

Id.

Id. The defining feature of mashup and remix videos is the creator's use of existing
16.
video and audio content to create original meaning. Id.
17.
Guy Raz, DJ Shadow on Sampling as a "Collage of Mistakes", NPR (Nov. 17, 2012),
http://www.wbur.org/npr/165145271/dj-shadow-on-sampling-as-a-collage-of-mistakes.
18.

Id.

Baracksdubs, Barack Obama Singing Call Me Maybe by Carly Rae Jepsen,
19.
YOUTUBE (Jun. 4, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-hX1YVzdnpEc&feature=plcp.
Cappapie, Norwegian Recycling-Miracles, YOUTUBE (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.
20.
youtube.comlwatch?v-i9qW6HEBoc.
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This "creative tsunami" 2 1 has given rise to great discord
between copyright owners and remix artists. 22 Under the copyright
regime, a content owner holds an exclusive right to prepare derivative
works; end-users must obtain permission through individually
negotiated licensing agreements before manipulating content. 23 Many
rightsholders have worked hard to protect this control they have over
future uses, with some even bringing legal action against infringers or
making public statements asserting their rights. 24
The reality, however, is that many amateur artists share and
remix copyrighted works without obtaining permission. 25 In this age
of participatory and democratized art, amateur video artists often
believe they are free to enter the pop culture world through their use
of famous content. 26 Modern America has become a call-and-response
society; as Greg Gillis of Girl Talk noted, "Every single P. Diddy song
that comes out, there's going to be ten-year-old kids doing remixes and
then putting them on the Internet."2 7 On the one hand, the increased
creative involvement of non-traditional creators, such as amateur
remix artists, benefits creative culture because innovation often comes
from "outside of the box." 2 8 Nevertheless, when amateur artists
disregard copyright law, content owners lose both licensing fees and
control of their work. 29
Still, this issue runs deeper than lost profits. It is about a
clash of ideology: copyright control versus creativity. 30 The traditional
licensing system encourages content owners to exercise control over
their works, reserving all rights unless they would benefit from a
Pat Aufderheide et al., Recut, Reframe, Recycle: Quoting Copyrighted Material in
21.
User-Generated Video, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 1 (Jan. 2008), http://infojustice.org/download/
copyright-flexibilities/articles/CSMRecutReframeRecyclereport.pdf.
See generally RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.
22.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); RON IDRA & JAMES L. ROGERS, PROFIT FROM INTELLECTUAL
23.
PROPERTY: THE COMPLETE LEGAL GUIDE TO COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, PATENTS, PERMISSIONS
AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS 171 (2003).

LESSIG, supra note 7, at 10; see, e.g., Robert J. Ambrogi, Yoko Ono Wins Fight Over
24.
Lennon Footage, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (July 1, 2009, 2:31 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/
legal blog-watchl2009/07/yoko-ono-wins-fight-over-lennon-footage.html; Shelley Germeaux, Yoko
Ono Makes it Clear-She Owns Content of Letters Lennon Sent to Others, EXAMINER.COM (Jan.
25, 2011), http://www.examiner. com/article/yoko-ono-makes-it-clear-she-owns-content-of-letterslennon-sent-to-others.
See generally RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.
25.
26.
See id.
27.
LESSIG, supra note 7 (quoting Gregg Gillis of Girl Talk).
Id.
28.
See generally AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 580-81 (4th ed.
29.
2010), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=OvklhwzTs-UC&printsec=frontcover&
source=gbs-ge-summary r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (explaining how content owners can
maximize the value of their works through licensing).
See generally RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.
30.
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licensing agreement. 3 1 This system functionally excludes amateur
artists, who have little bargaining power or ability to pay the high cost
of licensing content. 32
Rather than refraining from the use of copyrighted material,
however, many artists continue to create as though this were an "open
source" society, in which anyone is free to use existing content. 33
These artists value the innovation that comes from a democratized
culture, and they view the traditional licensing system as a restriction
on creativity. 34 Because of this fundamental clash of values, a
breakdown in the licensing market has occurred. The legal avenue for
obtaining permission excludes amateur artists, so they simply
continue to create without obtaining a license, while content owners
lose their fair share of licensing fees. 35 Given the depth of this
cultural impasse, copyright law needs to evolve to meet the needs of
both amateur artists and content owners. 36
This Note argues that culture is becoming more participatory
and democratized, with both professionals and non-professionals
producing works of art and publishing them to the Internet. In order
to accommodate the needs of all levels of artists, the video-content
licensing system must evolve to allow for greater amateur access.3 7
Analogizing to the performing-rights organizations in the music
industry, this Note advocates for a compulsory-licensing system for
video content. Part I uses two music-sampling cases, Grand Upright
Music v. Warner Bros. Records and Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, to
illustrate the use of bright-line rules in copyright clearance. 38 It also
explains why the fair use doctrine in copyright law does not provide
sufficient protection to remix artists. Part II argues that this strict
"one size fits all" system is out of touch with the values and social
norms of the "remix generation" and has led to confusion and
noncompliance.3 9

31.

See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS

IN A CONNECTED WORLD 200 (2001); Daniel J. Gervais, The Role of Copyright Collectives in Web
2.0 Music Markets, FROM THE SELECTEDWORKS OF DANIEL J GERVAIS (Oct. 2007), http://works.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=daniel_gervais.
32.
See supranote 31.
33.
RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.
See id.
34.
35.
See id.
See id.
36.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 25.
37.
38.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); Grand
Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
39.
See generally Pat Aufderheide et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Confusing:
User-Generated Video Creatorson Copyright, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.
centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/good-bad-confusing.pdf.
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Part III presents two alternative solutions to the current
licensing system: (1) an expansion of the "sharing economy"
approach, 40 in which copyright owners voluntarily agree to collaborate
in "peer-to-peer" marketplaces, 41 and (2) a compulsory-licensing model
with statutory rates that encourage sampling and distinguish between
professional and amateur artists. 42 While both models remove the
need for individually negotiated licenses and enable amateur artists to
easily experiment with new art forms, Part III ultimately advocates
for the compulsory license model. Such an approach would best
balance the interests of content owners and remix artists, creating a
viable market for video content. Part TV concludes that, despite the
conflicting interests of rightsholders, remix and mashup videos are
here to stay; the next step forward is to design a workable way to
generate profit from them.
I. "GET A LICENSE OR Do NOT SAMPLE": A RIGID APPROACH
Long before the rise of the video remix, music sampling took
root in popular culture, becoming central to the "ethos of rap [and] hip
hop music." 4 3

The repurposing of familiar melodies and harmonies

allowed listeners to experience music from past genres and redefined
originality in the music industry. 44 But record companies challenged
the use of unauthorized samples, even material as simple as a guitar
riff. 4 5 Additionally, "an increasingly hostile judiciary" responded by
limiting the freedom of artists to sample. 46
Two music-sampling cases paved the way for courts' strict
approach to licensing requirements: Grand Upright Music v. Warner
Bros. Records and Bridgeport v. Dimension Films.4 7 These cases
created legal and financial roadblocks for art forms like the mashup
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 226.
40.
41.
Erica Swallow, The Rise of the Sharing Economy, MASHABLE (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://mashable.com/2012/02/07/sharing-economy.
See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 29, at 733.
42.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 104; Sheila Rule, Record Companies are Challenging
43.
"Sampling" in Rap, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/21/arts/recordcompanies-are-challenging-sampling-in-rap.html.
44.
Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, NPR (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133306353/Digital-Music-Sampling-Creativity-Or-Criminality; see
also Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining
Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227 (2012).
Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with Public
45.
Enemy's Chuck D & Hank Shocklee, STAY FREE!, http://www.stayfreemagazine.orglarchives/
20/public-enemy.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
46.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 104.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005); Grand
47.
Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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and remix, for they held that sampling even one second of a sound
recording requires a license.4 8 The licensing crackdown increased the
cost of producing albums featuring sampled material, and many
artists, for the first time, experienced copyright laws as a limit on
their creativity. 49 Copyright law grew out of a desire to protect artists'
rights and thus induce creativity, but in this area, it began to
financially burden remix artists.5 0 Today, video-remix artists face the
same concerns, as copyright law continues to heavily favor copyright
owners, rather than sampling artists.5 1
A. The Impact of Grand Upright Music and Bridgeport on Licensing
The sustainability of the entertainment business relies upon
the enforcement of copyright and the ability to license content for a
There is monetary value associated with art because
profit. 52
copyright law gives content owners exclusive rights in their works,
which they may limit in exchange for licensing fees. 53 Still, licensing
is valuable not only because it creates profits from royalties but also
because it engenders intangible benefits. 54 For example, licensing a
song for use in a network television show increases national visibility,
which can lead to increased sales of that song on iTunes.5 5 After a
promotional campaign for the television show Grey's Anatomy featured
the Fray song "How to Save a Life," the song became one of the most
downloaded singles of 2006.56

In addition to increasing profits and visibility, a license allows
a content owner to set the parameters of authorized use to protect the
long-term value of the copyrighted work.5 7 A license is the primary
vehicle through which a content owner maximizes revenue, controls
the scope of use, and ensures that future use comports with the

See Tomasz Rychlicki & Adam Zieliiski, Is Sampling Always Copyright
48.
Infringement?, WIPO MAG. (Nov. 2009), http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2009/06/article0007.html.
49.
See Rule, supra note 43.
McLeod, supra note 45 (discussing how the crackdown on copyright infringement
50.
impacted Public Enemy's music). Public Enemy had previously been sampling thousands of
sounds, but it became too expensive to defend against copyright claims. Id.
Aufderheide, supranote 39, at 1.
51.
DARREN WILSEY
52.
LICENSING MUSIC 72 (2010).

&

DAYLLE DEANNA

SCHWARTZ,

THE

MUSICIAN'S

53.
Id. at 4.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
About The Fray, ARTISTS.MTV, http://www.mtv.comlartists/the-fray
56.
Nov. 18, 2012).
57.
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 42, at 584.

GUIDE

TO

(last visited
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owner's interests.5 8 The heart of licensing is copyright owners' right to
exclude others from using their works, either absolutely or in certain
contexts.59 For example, Twisted Sister frontman Dee Snider publicly
denounced 2012 Vice Presidential candidate Paul Ryan's use of his
signature anthem, "We're Not Gonna Take It." 6 0 Stating that he has
"never objected to anybody using that song," he drew the line at its use
in this context because of his strong condemnation of the candidate's
views. 61
Because licenses are the means through which rightsholders
specify what types of use are permissible, when mashups and remixes
started gaining popularity in the 1980s, record companies and content
owners fought to enforce licensing restrictions. 62 Courts responded
with strong statements in support of the exclusive rights of content
owners. 63 The court in Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records
fundamentally changed "the modus operandi of the hip-hop music
industry" by requiring preauthorization for all samples. 64 In Grand
Upright Music, the court's opinion began with the biblical quote "thou
shalt not steal."65

According to the court, the defendant Biz Markie

had violated not only the seventh commandment, but also US
copyright laws. 6 6 While the defendant argued that this practice had
become commonplace in the hip-hop and rap industry, the court
maintained that this pervasiveness did not justify infringement. 67
Grand Upright Music led the way for further criminalization of
unauthorized sampling, burdening a tradition that had become
second-nature to artists. 68
Courts subsequently continued to rigidly enforce licensing
requirements, culminating in the landmark decision Bridgeport v.
Dimension Films.6 9

Responding to the growth of digital sampling

disputes, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided that
something "approximating a bright-line rule" would benefit both the
58.
WILSEY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 4.
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 42, at 350.
59.
60.
Joy Behar: Say Anything! (Current TV broadcast Sept. 10, 2012), available at
http://current.com/shows/joy-behar/videos/dee-snider-i-denounce-paul-ryans-use-of-were-notgonna-take-it.
61.
Id.
McLeod, supra note 45.
62.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 104.
63.
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
64.
1991).
Id.
65.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 185.
See Rychlicki & Zieliiski, supranote 48.
68.
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
69.
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music industry and the courts. 0 Rather than requiring courts to
analyze the length of the sample, or its similarity to the original work,
the court announced that any amount of intentional sampling is
sufficient to establish infringement.7 1 Even a de minimis amount of
unauthorized sampling of a sound recording constitutes infringement,
because "the part taken is something of value." 7 2 The court held that
"a sound recording owner has the exclusive right to 'sample' his own
recording," and found that a license is required regardless of the
amount that the sampling artist intends to use. 7 3 In no uncertain
terms, the court warned artists: "Get a license or do not sample." 74
In the aftermath of Grand Upright Music and Bridgeport,
content owners can pursue a copyright claim against a remix artist for
any unauthorized sampling.7 5 While there have been a few victories
for sampling artists-in Newton v. Diamond, for example, the Ninth
Circuit found that the sample was minimal and that the average
person would not recognize the appropriation of the copyrighted
material 76-courts' general trajectory in recent years has been toward
increased copyright enforcement."
B. The Fair Use Doctrine:A Safety Net with Too Many Holes
Despite courts' unforgiving stance on licensing requirements,
the fair use provision in the Copyright Act permits some use of
copyrighted material without a license. 78 The fair use doctrine allows
for certain minimal uses that do not infringe on the content owner's
exclusive rights to reproduce and reuse the original work.79
Section 107 of the Copyright Act sets out a multi-factor analysis for

70.
71.
72.

Id. at 799.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 802; see also Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, supra note

44.
73.
Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801.
Id.
74.
Ben Challis, The Song Remains the Same: A Review of the Legalities of Music
75.
Sampling, WIPO MAG. (Nov. 2009), http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2009/06/article_0006.
html.

76.

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2003).

77.

KEMBREW MCLEOD

ET AL.,

CREATIVE

LICENSE

140,

147

(2011), available at

http:/Ibooks.google.com/books?hl=en&1r=&id=nOWdriHLHgQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=McLeod+a
nd+DiCola.+Creative+License:+The+Law+and+Culture+of+Digital+Sampling&ots=1zOfnLA9mn
&sig-wq8UGM0rpScZWPNVw5-zlBcudW8#v-onepage&q&f=false.
The Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education, CTR. FOR Soc.
78.
MEDIA, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/related-materials/codes/code-best-practicesfair-use-media-literacy-education (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
Copyright Basics: Fair Use, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., http://www.copyright.com/
79.
Services/copyrightoncampus/basics/fairuse.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).

USER-FRIENDLY LICENSING

2013]

417

determining whether something is fair use: (1) the purpose and
character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.8 0 These
factors primarily allow for the use of copyrighted materials for
"commentary, parody, news reporting, research and education."8 1
Nevertheless, the fair use doctrine does not automatically
apply to every amateur remix and mashup video, and relying on the
doctrine is a risky and uncertain alternative to obtaining a license.
First, fair use is most accurately understood, not as an exception to
the rule, but as a legal defense to a copyright infringement claim.82
When remix artists use copyrighted material without permission, even
if it is potentially fair use, the content owners may still pursue legal
claims against them. 83 End-users may assert a fair use defense in
response, but the burden of proof is on the defendants to show that
their work falls under the protection of fair use.8 4 Moreover, even if an
end-user ultimately succeeds in establishing a fair use defense, there
are legal expenses associated with defending against a copyright
claim. 8 5

Secondly, the Copyright Act merely provides guidelines, not
absolutes, for determining fair use, which makes the doctrine too
uncertain to provide dependable refuge for remix artists.8 6
Determinations of fair use depend on the case-by-case judgment of
courts, and "[t]he distinction between what is fair use and what is
infringement .

.

. [is] not always clear or easily defined."87

Because

fair use is context-specific, end-users have no clear guidance when
deciding whether a license is necessary. For example, while one of the
fair use factors is the amount and substantiality of the use, the statute
does not specify how many seconds of a video may be safely used in a
remix.88 In making such determinations, a court will engage in a
"qualitative" balancing test: if a remix artist uses only a small

80.
Fair Use, US COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html (last visited
Sept. 25, 2012).
81.

COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., supra note 79.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
McLeod, supra note 45.
Challis, supra note 75.
US COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 80.
CTR. FOR Soc. MEDIA, supra note 78.
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amount, but it was the "heart of the [original] work," then the fair use
doctrine may not apply.8 9
This leaves amateur artists with mixed results: on the one
hand, strict enforcement of copyright laws by courts, but on the other
hand, a broad and highly situational fair use provision. With little
education in copyright law, amateur artists are left with the choice of
seeking a license or risking possible litigation. It ultimately burdens
amateur creativity to require remix artists to make such
determinations of fair use and licensing, especially when they have
very little guidance or expertise in copyright law. The confusion
surrounding fair use underscores the need for a licensing system that
is streamlined for easy use by amateur artists.
C. Square Pegs: Trying to Fit UntraditionalArt into a Traditional
Framework
Without clear protection from the fair use doctrine, remix
artists must assume that a legal challenge to their work is always a
However, complying with copyright's strict licensing
possibility.
requirements has proven challenging for the remix and sample
generation, because, as Professor Daniel Gervais notes, "copyright was
not originally designed to deal with consumers"; rather, it was mainly
used to "make transactions between authors, publishers, producers,
and distributors possible." 90 In its present form, copyright licensing is
a one-size-fits-all model for buyers with bargaining power and artists
who can easily negotiate a licensing agreement with content owners.9 1
This traditional model creates two main obstacles for remix and
mashup artists: (1) the expense of licensing a large quantity of
samples, and (2) the inaccessibility of content owners to the average
person. 92 These challenges are especially pronounced where the
original content owner is a large media company or other party with
substantial bargaining power. 93
1. The $4.2 Million Album
The present licensing system, which is based in contract law,
requires sampling artists to negotiate licenses from copyright
89.

COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., supra note 79.

Gervais, supra note 31, at 3-5.
90.
91.
See id.
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 42, at 57 (explaining that it is often difficult for
92.
non-commercial end-users to even identify the rightsholders of the copyrighted material they
wish to use).
93.
Gervais, supranote 31, at 3-5.
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owners. 94 For most end-users, the actual and transaction costs of a
license are prohibitively expensive; it simply costs too much for most
users to legally create a remix or mashup video. 95 Mashups, by their
very nature, call for the use of multiple copyrighted samples, which
creates an unreasonably high price of production for most creators,
since they must license each sample individually. 96 It is possible for
artists to purchase sample libraries, but such media catalogues
typically consist of short, garden-variety snippets.9 7 The appeal of the
mashup is that it incorporates recognizable images or sounds, such as
the drumbeat from James Brown's "Funky Drummer," one of the most
sampled drumbeats in history.9 8 However, acquiring the rights to use
a well-known sample, like this popular drumbeat, 99 is an "expensive
and complicated process."1 00
To illustrate with an example from the music industry: DJ
Gregg Gillis, also known as "Girl Talk," is perhaps the most famous
digital mashup artist, but he regularly declines to follow copyright
laws because of the cost of licensing.1 0 1 Known for creating a "feverish
collision of unlike music," Gillis used 372 overlapping samples in his
2010 album, "All Day." 102 While clearance for some copyrighted
material is not unreasonable (an end-user can attain a license to use
certain text, photos, and artwork for under $200 per use), 103 that price
skyrockets for remixes and mashup artists that, like Gillis, use
hundreds of samples per project.104

94.

RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION: How To LICENSE & CLEAR COPYRIGHTED

MATERIALS ONLINE & OFF 10 (4th ed. 2010); Gervais, supra note 31, at 3-5 (illustrating the idea
that, without a copyright collective or clearinghouse, end-users must negotiate directly with
rightsholders).
95.

RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.

96.

Id.

Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?,supra note 44.
97.
Id.
98.
99.
Joe Fassler, How Copyright Law Hurts Music, From Chuck D to Girl Talk,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.theatlantic.comlentertainment/archive/2011/04/
how-copyright-law-hurts-music-from-chuck-d-to-girl-talk/236975 ("If you wanted to sample, say,
'Fight the Power' by Public Enemy-well, that song contains 20 samples. You'd have to get
permission from Def Jam, which owns the sound recording rights, and then Public Enemy's song
publisher. Then you'd have to go to the other 20 song publishers and get permission to use the
song-it creates kind of a domino effect.").
100.
Id.
Id.; Joe Mullin, Why the Music Industry Isn't Suing Mashup Star 'Girl Talk',
101.
PAIDCONTENT (Nov. 17, 2010, 3:24 AM), http://paidcontent.org/2010/11/17/419-why-the-musicindustry-isnt-suing-mashup-star-girl-talk.
102.
Kyle Eustice, Girl Talk's Gregg Gillis Rides the Sample Wave a Little Longer, THE
PITCH (June 12, 2012), http://www.pitch.com/kansascity/girl-talk-gregg-gillis-june-2012-kclive/Content?oid=2907124.
STIM, supra note 94.
103.
104.
RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supranote 3.
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Because Gillis uses about twenty-one music clips per song, if he
were to legally purchase each sample, it would amount to an average
of $260,000 per song and $4.2 million per album.10 5 Even as Gillis
continues to sell out large venues, he has made it clear that he is
unwilling and unable to follow the law at such a price.10 6 Although
Gillis's mashups seem like a "lawsuit waiting to happen," some have
speculated that he would be "a ready-made hero for copyright
reformers," and content owners would prefer not to martyr him and
risk inciting reform of their rights.10 7 Gillis enjoys a level of visibility
that makes him an unappealing defendant; one journalist speculated
that "if he were sued, he'd have some of the best copyright lawyers in
the country knocking on his door asking to take his case for free."1 08
But most amateur mashup artists do not have the reputation and
visibility that Gillis does, and therefore they must choose between
paying millions of dollars for samples, risking a copyright suit, or
giving up their art. 109
2. Negotiating with Taylor Swift
The rise of the amateur-revised video reflects the
democratization of culture, in that more non-professional artists are
participating in artistic production on the web than ever. However,
the licensing system, for all practical purposes, excludes amateur
Consider what would happen if an amateur artist
end-users. 110
wished to obtain a license to use and revise footage from a Taylor
Swift music video. The amateur would likely have difficulty even
locating the owner of the content-whether it is Taylor Swift or a
media company-to negotiate a license.
Even if the artist had the opportunity to communicate with the
content owner, he would probably be unsuccessful in obtaining a
license unless he could show that the rightsholder stood to benefit
from the artist's use of the footage. The content owner would be
concerned not only about the short-term value of a license (in the form
of fees), but also the long-term value of the original work."1 There is
risk involved in indiscriminately licensing to any party that asks, and
copyright holders have the prerogative to deny authorization to

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Mullin, supra note 101.
Id.
RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.
Id.; Gervais, supra note 31, at 3-5.
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 42, at 584-85.
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anyone they choose. 112 If amateur remix artists do not receive
permission, or if they are unaware who holds the rights, they are left
with two options-they may either engage in unauthorized use of
copyrighted material, which may or may not qualify as fair use, or
they may accept copyright as a limit on their creativity. In an age in
which "everything is a remix" 113 and participatory culture is highly
valued, a system that forces amateur artists to choose between
illegality and self-censorship can nevertheless have a chilling effect on
creativity. 11 4
According to renowned intellectual property professor
Lawrence Lessig, the exclusion of amateur artists from the licensing
system is one example of "copyright control out of control." 115
Requiring individuals to negotiate contracts with media companies is
the functional equivalent of shutting down legal avenues for amateur
music to develop. 16 While it is well established that artists deserve
compensation for future uses of their work, the traditional "all rights
reserved" model of copyright licensing allows industry to control the
course of innovation.11 7 The web provides a "free space of innovation,"
and video-editing technology has become available to the masses, but
the copyright-licensing system has not kept pace with these
changes.1 18 The Internet is a universal resource, and it must be able
to grow without limiting creative content, which means adapting
licensing in a way that encourages new art forms and democratic
participation in culture.1 19
II. PLAYING BY THEIR OWN RULES: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL NORMS ON
COPYRIGHT COMPLIANCE

Even though Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records
and Bridgeport v. Dimension Films set the tone for harsh enforcement
of copyright law, there is strong evidence that many end-users still do
not comply with copyright-clearance requirements. 120 While using
copyrighted content in mashups and remixes has become a common
artistic practice, many sampling artists decline to obtain permission

112.
113.
visited Oct.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 581-82.
About, EVERYTHING IS A REMIX, http://www.everythingisaremix.info/about
14, 2012).
LESSIG, supra note 7.
LESSIG, supra note 31, at 183.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 37.
Aufderheide et al., supra note 39, at 6.

(last

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

422

[Vol. 15:2:407

for a variety of reasons.121 First, while the law may be at the forefront
of content owners' minds, it is not always a primary consideration for
artists; rather, they think about licensing requirements only after
they have been contacted about possible infringement. 122
Second, many end-users do not fully understand their
In one study, "[r]espondents
responsibilities under the law.
demonstrated confusion, anxiety, and fear when asked about their
copyright behavior." 123 In particular, the fair use provision in the
and
of
uncertainty
source
is
a
major
Act
Copyright
misunderstanding. 12 4 Lastly, the values of today's "remix generation,"
including adherence to an "open culture" philosophy, strongly inform
social norms and conduct.1 25 Because remixing is socially acceptable,
and often encouraged, fear of "criminal sanctions, cease-and-desist
letters, [and] civil suits for infringement" fails to effectively deter
unauthorized use. 126 The confluence of these factors presents a major
12 7
challenge to ensuring copyright compliance.
A. Just an Art Project: Copyright Permissionas an Afterthought
For many sampling artists, copyright permission is an
afterthought. Their driving force is creating art, not complying with
copyright laws. 128 Thus, they may only become aware of possible
copyright infringement when the content owner notifies them with a
cease-and-desist letter or lawsuit.1 29 The story of The Grey Album
illustrates the difficulty of incentivizing licensing when artists do not
think about copyright clearance before creating. 130 Brian Burton, aka
"Danger Mouse," rose to fame in 2004 after releasing The Grey Album,
a mashup record of the a cappella version of Jay-Z's The Black Album

Id.
121.
See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2004),
122.
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/02/62276.
Aufderheide et al., supra note 39, at 3.
123.
124.

JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 112 (2006).

Aufderheide et al., supra note 39, at 12.
125.
Hetcher, supra note 7, at 1871.
126.
127.
See generally Aufderheide et al., supra note 39, at 12; Hetcher, supra note 7, at
1871.
See, e.g., Nekesa Mumbi Moody, 'Art Project'Steps into Legal 'Grey'Area, SAN DIEGO
128.
UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 29, 2004), http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040229/news_1a29
grey.html (discussing the legal controversy surrounding the release of DJ Danger Mouse's
album, which combined content from Jay-Z and the Beatles).
E.g., id.
129.
Id.
130.
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and instrumentals from the Beatles' The White Album. 131 Response to
the album was "thermonuclear"; it was "hotter-than-hot." 3 2 But
because Burton failed to obtain a legal license for the content he used,
EMI, the copyright holder for the Beatles, took legal steps against
him. 133

After EMI ordered Danger Mouse and retailers to cease
distribution, Burton responded: "I intended for it to be for friends and
for people who knew my stuff. I figured it would get passed around,
and it would be this little underground thing, but it kind of took off on
its own." 13 4 In what has become a common refrain for remix artists,
Burton stated, "[It] was not my intent to break copyright laws. It was
my intent to make an art project." 135
Despite EMI's efforts and Burton's cooperation, no one could
stop fans from circulating The Grey Album.1 36 A few thousand printed
copies quickly turned into must-have collectors' items, with the album
selling on eBay for $81.137 Then, in a protest event dubbed "Grey
Tuesday," an activist group posted copies of the album for free
download on various websites in demonstration against the
cease-and-desist letters.13 8 While such action by a third party may
seem like a victimless crime, it divests content owners of licensing
opportunities and profits. 139 This story highlights the reality that,
even where artists do not intend to violate copyright laws, licensing is
too often a secondary consideration. 140
B. Mass Confusion over Licensing: Copyright's Version of the Hanging
Chad
People often do not observe licensing requirements because
copyright laws are "complicated, arcane, and counterintuitive."141 A
study conducted by the Center for Social Media (CSM) studied the
attitudes and practices of college and graduate students who upload
online video, and discovered that participants were "universally
131.
Ryan, Music/Video Mashups: What's at Stake?, ToPICS IN DIGITAL MEDIA-SPRING
2010 (Apr. 5, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://cultureandcommunication.org/tdm/s0/04/05/musicvideomashups-whats-at-stake.
Shachtman, supra note 122.
132.
Moody, supra note 128.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Ryan, supra note 131.
136.
Shachtman, supra note 122.
137.
Ryan, supra note 131.
138.
Moody, supra note 128.
139.
140.
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LITMAN, supra note 124.
141.
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For
under-informed and misinformed about [copyright] law." 4 2
example, some participants conflated trademark and copyright
concepts, and others mistakenly believed that open culture, rather
than copyright protection, was the default setting of copyright law. 143
Where participants lacked a nuanced understanding of how
copyright law applies situationally, they used a variety of binary,
"good-bad" categories to order their choices.1 44 The individual's own
sense of right and wrong, rather than copyright fundamentals, guided
the individual's copyright-related behavior.1 45 Under the participants'
own logic, their amateur art had no real impact on major marketplace
actors, so the participants should be able to freely create as long as
their work had low commercial value.1 46 Participants were essentially
"making up rules themselves about what kind of existing intellectual
property it was appropriate to use in their own creation."1 47 Using
their self-made rules, they rationalized their use of unauthorized
material as contributing to the art community without materially
harming content owners. 148
As copyright scholar Jessica Litman has noted, the statutory
fair use provision is also a strong source of confusion for prospective
licensees.1 49 According to the CSM study, the student participants
revealed a significant misunderstanding of the fair use provision in
the copyright statute. 5 0 As discussed in Part I, fair use provides a
right to reproduce copyrighted material without permission or
payment under some circumstances.1 5 For example, individuals may
use copyrighted pieces for some educational purposes or in parodies of
that original work.1 52 Section 107 of the Copyright Act sets out a
multi-factor analysis for determining whether something is fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted
work.1 53
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As is common with many such tests, however, the factors are
For
often difficult to apply because they are merely guidelines.
instance, one factor is the amount of copyrighted material used, but
the statute does not specify a number of words, lines, or notes that
may safely be used without permission. 154 The CSM study highlights
the ambiguity and confusion surrounding fair use and the risk that
end-users undertake in using copyrighted works. The majority of
survey respondents (76 percent) believed that the exception protected
their use of copyrighted materials, although no one was able to
accurately describe the doctrine. 155 The respondents conveyed a
variety of inaccurate beliefs about fair use, including two participants
who thought the statute "stipulated a fixed amount of time, e.g., 'over
15 seconds of someone else's song."' 15 6 Such mistaken beliefs could put

end-users at risk of copyright infringement, since, as the courts in
Grand Upright Music and Bridgeport established, sampling even a
small amount is not fair use.' 5 7
Another participant in the CSM study incorrectly believed that
there is an exemption for all educational and non-commercial use.158
Under the fair use doctrine, however, there are no absolutes, which
definition
of
legal
is
no
clear-cut
there
means
that
"non-commercial."15 9 While some non-commercial uses may be fair
use, there are grey areas, particularly in the context of online videos.
Even if a remix artist is not seeking monetary compensation for his
work, the website might, nonetheless, profit from advertising or data
mining, through which companies increase revenue by gathering
information about consumer buying habits.160
Misconceptions about fair use underscore the difficulty in
enforcing compliance with current copyright laws, and the risk that
end-users assume when they create unauthorized remixes. Many
creators of user-generated videos do not seek a license because they do
not believe the law applies to them.1 61 Moreover, end-users generally
possess a narrow view of "market impact," believing that their actions
do not cause market harm because no one would intentionally buy

154.
Id.
155.
Aufderheide et al., supra note 39, at 7.
156.
Id.
157.
See supra Part I.A.
Aufderheide et al., supra note 39, at 7.
158.
Myths and Realities About Fair Use, TECHDIRT (June 1, 2012), http://www.techdirt.
159.
(excerpting PATRICIA
com/articles/20120530/17333319132/myths-realities-about-fair-use.shtml
AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE (2011)).
160.
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their work instead of the original artist's work.1 62 In contrast to this
belief, the potential market goes far beyond direct substitution; most
notably, there is a licensing market in which content owners profit
from allowing others to use their work in new projects.16 3 For
rights-holding musicians, for instance, there is often more money in
licensing their music than there is in either record deals or touring.164
But, when average individuals conceptualize the market and
rationalize their own use of copyrighted material, they often fail to
consider their impact on secondary markets. 6 5
As the Second Circuit indicated in the photocopying case
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, there is market harm where a
party fails to utilize an available licensing market.1 66 While the
Texaco research center could have paid royalties through the
established copyright clearance house in the publishing industry, it
instead copied articles from scientific journals without paying the
proper fees.1 67 The court found that Texaco's unauthorized copying
was not fair use, and that it resulted in the harm of lost royalties. 6 8
The lesson of Texaco is that "courts .

.

. consider whether potential

'

market harm might exist beyond that of direct substitution, such as in
the potential existence of a licensing market."1 69 The complete picture
of market harm has yet to become ingrained in the public
consciousness, however, as individual end-users continue to believe
their small-time web videos pose no financial threat to powerful
content owners.1 70 Because many end-users mistakenly believe that
their works do not affect anyone's financial interests, they do not see
why securing authorization for their creative projects is necessary.17

LESSIG, supra note 7, at 13 ("I think, just morally, that the music wasn't really
162.
hurting anyone. And there's no way anyone was buying my CD instead of someone else's [that I
had sampled]." (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg Gillis)).
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1. YouTube Copyright School: Even a Cartoon Pirate Cannot Save this
Sinking Ship
Despite public-education attempts, such as the "Just Say Yes to
Licensing" campaign promoted by the White House Information
Infrastructure Task Force, misconceptions about copyright law
continue to inform public behavior. 17 2 The CSM study reported that
respondents generally did not understand basic facts about copyright,
even when professors had trained them on the topic and warned them
about the risks of copyright infringement. 17 3 This highlights the
challenges of changing social norms through greater awareness, as
"[t]he current copyright statute has proved to be remarkably
education-resistant." 17 4
After lawmakers and the entertainment industry criticized
Google for being too quiet in the fight against copyright infringement,
the company started its own program to educate copyright violators
To
and correct common misconceptions about copyright law. 7 5
increase compliance with copyright law, Google requires infringers to
This education program
attend YouTube Copyright School.176
required copyright violators to watch a four-and-a-half minute tutorial
about copyright rules, followed by a multiple-choice quiz. 177 The video
featured a cartoon pirate character who "inadvertently breaks
copyright laws" by taping scenes from a film in a movie theater and
uploading them to YouTube.17 8
Some bloggers have pointed out flaws in Google's program,
questioning its effectiveness in clearing up public confusion.1 79 For
instance, while the YouTube Copyright School tutorial singles out
remixes as potential copyright danger zones, it fails to explain in
explicit terms what is legal and what is illegal with respect to this
It suggests that users can avoid copyright
creative practice.18 0
infringement by making "original works," but it does not further
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define that term. 18 1 Moreover, it glosses over the fair use doctrine,
essentially noting its existence without any further explanation. 182
The basic message of the program is to create with caution and avoid
using copyrighted material altogether, rather than risk liability for
copyright infringement by remixing.1 83
YouTube's Copyright School fails to provide concrete guidance
to prospective sampling artists, instead serving as a general warning
that legal issues might arise when individuals use copyrighted
material. The description claims that "YouTube remains committed to
protecting original creative works, whether produced by an
established star or the next breakout artist." 184 But its education
program fails to shed light on how an up-and-coming sampling artist
can legally participate in remix culture.185 The company notes that
any uncertainty should be directed to a "qualified copyright
attorney." 8 6 Such advice is reasonable, as many have questioned
whether it is even YouTube's responsibility to ensure compliance, yet
it is probably unrealistic to expect that average users will hire an
attorney.187 The inadequacy of YouTube's Copyright School brings to
light the dearth of suitable resources available to amateurs interested
in creating legally revised videos.' 8 8 The simplistic cartoon tutorial
does very little to remedy common misconceptions or advance
innovative, yet legally created, art. 189 It instead relegates remix and
mashup videos to a grey area and suggests that users simply avoid
such unpredictable terrain.190
C. A War of Ideas: Innovation v. Control
Many end-users also openly defy copyright laws out of
indignation for a system that prioritizes copyright control over
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creativity.1 91 In this zero-sum game, in which a legal victory for
rightsholders means a loss for end-users, a ruling for the industry can
severely restrict the freedom of artists to experiment with new
forms. 19 2 Because many end-users value open culture over the ability
of a content owner to control his works, court rulings that restrict the
freedom of artists to experiment with new forms are difficult to
enforce. As copyright scholar Jessica Litman has argued, "People
For example, the
don't obey laws that they don't believe in."1 93
protestors who kept Danger Mouse's The Grey Album alive on the web
perceived EMI's cease-and-desist letters as acts of corporate
censorship. 9 4 In their view, by preventing distribution, EMI was
trying to control what the public could and could not hear.1 95 What
was ultimately at stake to them was the future of an art form and the
ability of artists to control innovation.1 96
Other advocates of free culture have made similar social-cost
arguments, claiming that, under the current system, a clash of values
is inevitable as the "old" collides with the "new."1 9 7 According to the
open-source documentary, RIP!: A Remix Manifesto, "[tihis is a war of
ideas, and the battleground is the Internet."19 8 To some who oppose
strict copyright enforcement, powerful content owners seek to
maintain the current business model because it concentrates culture
in their hands. 199 Such individuals see copyright restrictions as an
impediment to innovation, and argue that, "to build free societies, you
must limit the control of the past." 200 Rather than embracing the
ideals of free culture, however, content owners and digital platforms
like YouTube are cracking down on copyright infringement more than

191.
RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3 (indicating that copyright owners' fixation
on control of their content is a hindrance to creativity and that "to build free societies you must
limit the control of the past").
192.
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (changing the modus operandi of the hip-hop industry by holding that all sampling must
be cleared with the copyright owner).
193.
LITMAN, supra note 124.
194.
Moody, supra note 128.
195.
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196.
Id.
197.

RIP!: A REMIX MANIFESTO, supra note 3.
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ever. 20 1 Many revised videos are often simply removed from the web
using software that does not require human review. 202
One example of such content-management software is
Using ContentlD, content owners provide
YouTube's ContentlD.
YouTube with reference files and metadata describing the content
they own. 2 03 They also choose a policy they would like YouTube to
apply in the event ContentlD technology identifies their copyrighted
material-their choices are to monetize, track, or block the
unauthorized uses. 204 YouTube then compares the files uploaded to
the website with the reference data, and ContentlD technology
automatically identifies matching content and applies the preferred
policy. 2 0 5 Because ContentlD is automatic and requires no human
intervention, this content-management system efficiently blocks many
videos that remix copyrighted material. 206
Lawrence Lessig, perhaps the most prominent voice for free
culture, argues that such blanket removal policies drive remix culture
underground, "criminalizing" art forms like mashups. 207 As Lessig
suggests, remixing and repurposing is the way that this generation
communicates, so copyright law needs to legitimize, rather than
criminalize, this practice. 208 Our democratized artistic culture needs a
legal space in which remixes and mashups can thrive. 209
III. THE FUTURE OF VIDEO-CONTENT LICENSING: SHARING ECONOMIES
V. COMPULSORY LICENSING

There are many indications that the video-licensing system is
flawed. 210 Requiring amateurs to navigate the complexities of
copyright law has resulted in systematic noncompliance. 2 1 1 This Note
Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Feb. 20,
201.
2012) (explaining YouTube's new technology that enables rights holders to better manage their
content).

Andy Baio, No Copyright Intended, WAXY (Dec. 9, 2011), http://waxy.org/2011/12/
202.
no-copyrightjintended.
ContentID, supra note 201.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Fred Von Lohmann, YouTube's Content ID (C)ensorship Problem Illustrated, ELEC.
206.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/youtubes-content-id-censorship-problem.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at xvii ("What does it mean to a society when a whole
207.
generation is raised as criminals?").
Id. at 18.
208.
Id. (describing the criminalization of a generation as "collateral damage" in the
209.
copyright wars and urging reconsideration of these policies).
210.
See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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suggests two possible solutions that would simplify the current system
and provide increased access for remix artists: (1) an expansion of the
"sharing economy" approach, 212 exemplified by Creative Commons
licenses, in which copyright owners voluntarily agree to participate in
(2)
a
marketplace; 213 and
collaborative
"peer-to-peer"
a
compulsory-licensing model, with statutory rates that encourage
sampling and distinguish between professional and amateur artists. 214
In evaluating these possible licensing arrangements, it is important to
consider the value systems that underlie each framework and whether
they promote a balance between rightsholders and future users.
A. The "SharingEconomy" Approach: How It Launched an SNL Star
Sharing economies, otherwise known as "collaborative
consumption" or "peer-to-peer marketplaces," connect people and
provide open access to resources and information. 2 15 An example is
the online community marketplace, Airbnb, which allows individuals
to list and monetize their extra living space for vacationers seeking
short-term accommodations. 2 1 6 In this example of a transaction-based
sharing economy, money changes hands between members of the
community. In contrast, borrowing-based networks such as the travel
website, Couchsurfing, encourage free sharing of resources between
members. 217 With participants contributing their resources to a
"user-drive collaborative workspace" or 'library," the heart of these
marketplaces is exchange and mutual benefit, not money. 218 In this
type of community, "access to culture is regulated not by price, but by
a complex set of social relations." 219
Using the principles of borrow-based marketplaces, the
nonprofit organization Creative Commons has created a licensing
infrastructure that maximizes the sharing of creative resources. 220
Co-founded by Lawrence Lessig, Creative Commons offers an
alternative to traditional licensing by replacing individually
negotiated agreements with easy-to-use standardized licenses. 221 The

212.
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214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
2012).
221.

LESSIG, supra note 7, at 226.
Swallow, supra note 41.
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 42.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 156-62.
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/home/about (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
Swallow, supra note 41.
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Id. at 145.
About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Feb. 21,
Id.

432

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:2:407

default setting of copyright requires end-users, such as remixers, to
obtain explicit permission for use in advance. 222 Creative Commons
has flipped this standard on its head, allowing content owners to grant
blanket permission to all end-users in advance by contributing their
works to a collective "pool of . .. creativity," while specifying which
rights they wish to retain. 223 For example, artists decide before
releasing their works into the commons whether they will allow
end-users to modify their material, use it for commercial purposes, or
license derivative works. 224 Prospective end-users need not negotiate
these terms with the copyright owners because the Creative Commons
license specifies which uses are authorized. 225
By enabling rightsholders to change from the traditional
default of "all rights reserved" to "some rights reserved," this sharing
economy gives end-users access to certain copyrighted content without
the step of asking for permission. 226 Collective Commons licenses
remove the need to pay-per-use, thereby providing amateur artists
with a pool of content that they can share or remix for free. 2 27 The
advantage of "collaborative consumption" 228 is that it brings together
artists by creating "a pool of content that can be copied, distributed,
edited, remixed, and built upon, all within the boundaries of copyright
law." 22 9 It reduces transaction costs and the expense of licensing
through a free, public, and standardized infrastructure. 2 30
By
minimizing the costs to end-users, Creative Commons encourages both
professionals and amateurs to legally participate in creative culture. 231
This ultimately fosters cultural production by removing the hurdle of
negotiating a license for use.
The Creative Commons model also strikes a balance between
the needs of artists and licensees by creating the opportunity for
mutual benefit and exchange. For example, before they were a
household name, the comedy group "Lonely Island," featuring Andy
Samberg, developed a fan base by releasing their material online
under a Creative Commons license. 232 The group shot a pilot for Fox,
Id.
222.
223.
Id.
224.
About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last
visited Nov. 24, 2012).
225.
See id.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Swallow, supra note 41.
229.
CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 220.
230.
See id.
231.
See id.
232.
Mia Garlick, Lonely Island, CREATIVE COMMONS (Oct. 17, 2005), http://creative
commons.org/weblog/entry/7065.
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but after the network decided not to air it, Lonely Island
website
using
an
video
on
their
posted
the
This licensing
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike license. 233
option allowed fans to use their material without requesting
permission, with the following conditions on end-users: (1) they must
attribute their uses in the way specified by Lonely Island; (2) they
may not use their copyrighted works for commercial purposes; and (3)
if they change the original material, they may only distribute the
resulting work using a similar license to this one. 2 34 Lonely Island
chose this type of license because they wanted to encourage their fans
to remix their material and share it with others, but they also wanted
to reserve some control for themselves, such as the exclusive right to
use their works for commercial purposes.2 35
By developing their fan base and spreading their works online,
Lonely Island was ultimately able to cross over to a transaction-based
economy. 236 Creative Commons licensing ultimately paved the way for
Lonely Island's commercial success. 237 After someone at Saturday
Night Live saw Lonely Island's work on the web, the NBC show asked
Andy Samberg to join the cast, and it featured the entire group in a
number of popular digital shorts from 2005 to 2012.238
As this example illustrates, the Creative Commons model
accomplishes two things that the traditional all-rights-reserved
approach does not. First, it takes into account the social norms of the
"remix generation" by minimizing restrictions on creativity and
eliminating the need for individually negotiated contracts. 239 Second,
it creates an easy framework in which the copyright owner can
manage his content and enumerate which rights he wishes to
reserve. 240
Nevertheless, even though the "digital commons" model
enables a creativity-sharing network for both professional and
nonprofessional artists, it is not a sustainable replacement for
traditional licensing of video content. While it provides a beneficial
alternative in many circumstances of amateur art, removing money

233.
See id.
234.
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5), CREATIVE
COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5 (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
235.
Garlick, supra note 232.
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 227-28.
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See id.
Garlick, supra note 232.
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from the equation entirely has a number of downsides. 241 For
instance, by granting advanced permission for use to all prospective
licensees, content owners lose a significant amount of control over
future use.24 2 Because Creative Commons licenses do not involve
individually negotiated contracts, owners often do not know who is
using their work once they release it into the collective pool of
content. 243
Moreover, while artists may benefit from the redistribution and
free publicity for their work, end-users do not directly compensate the
artists for permission to use their works. 244 A specific demographic of
artists-primarily aspiring or up-and-coming artists-stand to gain
from this arrangement because it enables them to build a fan base. In
contrast, well-known artists may not benefit from using a Creative
Commons license, as they have more opportunities for commercial
licensing than amateur artists. 245 To be sustainable on a widespread
basis, all parties would need to buy into the idea of free culture.
Creative Commons licensing, however, typically does not attract the
popular content that remix artists wish to use.
In browsing the Creative Commons pool of creative material,
there is a notable lack of current VH1 Top 20 music videos and
Established artists and
material from popular television shows.
producers have little incentive to participate in a community built on
mutual exchange because their works already have monetary value. 2 4 6
If a content owner can easily find a licensee to pay per use of his
material, it would be financially irrational to release it for free into the
commons. As a result, while the Creative Commons market connects
amateur artists in a network of shared creativity, this system is not a
viable replacement for the licensing of "famous" content. Without a
mechanism for generating direct profit, the Creative Commons
alternative will continue to have a limited role in licensing.
B. A Compulsory-LicensingModel: Collective Management of Video
Content
In the music world, some cover songs become so popular that

241.

7 Things You Should Know about . . . Creative Commons, EDUCAUSE LEARNING

INITIATIVE (Mar. 2007), http://net.educause.edulir/library/pdf/EL17023.pdf.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
See Criticism and Disadvantages of CC, KIRUBA WIKi, http://www.kiruba.com/
245.
copyrightandleft/wiki/index.php?title=Criticism andDisadvantages-ofCC (last updated July
27, 2011).
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they eclipse the original work. 2 4 7 When people hear "R-E-S-P-E-C-T,"
only one name comes to mind: Aretha Franklin. Despite the fact that
Otis Redding originally wrote and performed the song "Respect,"
Aretha was the one who won the Grammy. 248 Even though many
cover artists do not achieve this level of success, copyright law allows
anyone to try.2 4 9 Under § 115 of the Copyright Act, artists may record
and distribute any musical composition that has been previously
recorded and released to the public, as long as they obtain a
compulsory mechanical license. 250 This provision requires that an
artist send a notice of intent to the publisher within thirty days of
distribution and pay statutorily determined royalties (currently 9.1
cents per copy per song). 2 5 1

While Congress adopted compulsory licensing to prevent
monopolies in the music publishing industry, 252 today it benefits
amateur artists in a significant way. Prospective licensees do not
need to ask permission from a music publisher to use copyrighted
musical compositions; if they cannot locate the copyright owner, or if
that rightsholder is unwilling to negotiate, licensees can still obtain a
license through a copyright clearinghouse. 2 5 3 Artists who wish to
record an existing musical composition may easily obtain the legal
rights they need through the Harry Fox Agency (HFA), which acts as
an "information source, clearinghouse, and monitoring service" for
musical copyright licensing. 254 HFA simplifies licensing by serving as
a single source for the collection and distribution of royalties, which
removes the hurdle of individually negotiating a contract for use. 2 5 5

247.
Dylan Moore, Top 10 Cover Songs More Famous than the Original, TOPTENZ.NET,
http://www.toptenz.net/top-10-cover-songs-more-famous-than-the-original.php (last visited Nov.
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visited, Nov. 24, 2012).
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COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 220 (2010), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edul
cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1499&context=chtlj (discussing the history of compulsory licensing).
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jsp (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
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See Shane Valenzi, Note, A Rollicking Band of Pirates: Licensing the Exclusive
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Following this model of mandatory collective management,
Congress could adopt compulsory licensing of video content as an
alternative to traditional licensing. To streamline the process of
obtaining a compulsory license, the system would need a copyright
clearinghouse to play a similar role to that of HFA. One of the
primary benefits of this model is that it provides amateur artists with
easy access to copyrighted material. While it does require some
affirmative action by end-users, in that they must provide notice and
pay statutory royalties, it eliminates the problem of inferior
bargaining power. When seeking a compulsory license, prospective
licensees do not need to locate rightsholders or persuade them to
authorize their intended use.25 6
Under the traditional model,
end-users would need to demonstrate that a license would be
Otherwise, that
financially beneficial to the content owner.
rightsholder would have no real incentive to yield her exclusive rights.
In contrast, compulsory licensing is available to any interested party,
regardless of bargaining power, as long as the work has been
previously recorded and released to the public. 257
Additionally, this model addresses the issue of social norms
and user confusion by providing a clear process for obtaining a
compulsory license. Under the current system, many remix and
mashup artists do not understand when a license is necessary or what
steps they should take to gain permission. 258 As a result, there is
widespread unauthorized use of copyrighted material. 25 9 A mandatory
collective management system, with one source for information and
copyright clearance, would simplify the process and help amateur
artists with the details of licensing. 260
Perhaps most importantly, mandatory collective management
benefits both the rightsholder and the prospective licensee. 261 Unlike
the Creative Commons model, compulsory licensing has a mechanism
for generating profit. While any artist, even amateurs, may take
advantage of qualifying works, this system still ensures that the
content owner receives compensation for such use. 2 6 2 End-users pay
for the privilege of using copyrighted content, but they do not need to

US COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 251, at 3.
256.
RICHARD STIM, MUSIC LAW: How TO RUN YOUR BAND'S BUSINESS 270 (6th ed. 2009).
257.
See supra Part II.B.
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See supra Part I.1B.
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See e.g., Valenzi, supra note 255.
261.
See Nate Anderson, Barenaked Ladies: If I Had a Compulsory Blanket Music
License, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/04/barenakedladies-if-i-had-a-compulsory-blanket-music-license.
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negotiate a royalty rate because it is statutorily prescribed. 263 Parties
may negotiate for a different rate if they wish, but compulsory
licensing makes this a matter of choice rather than necessity. 264
Nevertheless, compulsory licensing, as it exists in the context
of musical composition, does not fully address the particularities of
remix and mashup videos; accordingly, Congress would need to make
certain modifications to this model for video content. In particular,
lawmakers would need to establish three elements tailored to the
video arts: (1) protection for derivative works, (2) royalty rates that
distinguish between amateur and professional artists, and (3)
reasonable royalty rates for samples.
With these three changes,
amateur artists would have increased access to copyrighted content
and greater protection for their resulting works than the traditional
system provides.
First, § 115 allows licensees of musical compositions to make a
new arrangement of the recording, but specifies that the arrangement
"shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work." 26 5
Cover artists may bring their own meaning and interpretation to a
piece of work, but there are limits on the types of changes they can
make. 2 6 6 However, remix and mashup videos, by their very nature,
are all about the unexpected, the pairing of incongruent elements to
create the unforeseen. 267 In order to preserve the integrity of this art
form, compulsory licensing of video content must allow end-users to
freely change the works they are using. The value of amateur video
art is in its unpredictable, inventive character, so lawmakers should
not restrict the extent to which end-users can use content creatively.
Secondly, copyright royalty judges, who set the mechanical
license royalty rates for music compositions, currently distinguish
rates on the basis of category (including physical phonorecords,
permanent downloads, limited downloads, ringtones, and interactive
streaming), and on the basis of the release date of the original work.268
In addition to these classifications, lawmakers should account for
whether the intended user is an amateur or professional artist. The
limited bargaining power of amateur artists, as well as the fact that
many of their projects are not for commercial use, justifies this
differential treatment of amateurs and professionals. High rates run
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17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
See id.
Raz, supra note 17.
Mechanical License Royalty Rates, supra note 251.

438

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:2:407

the risk of either chilling amateur art, because they make remix and
mashup videos prohibitively expensive, or encouraging unauthorized
use, as is currently happening with video content. 269 Therefore, in
order to encourage a range of artists to legally create remix and
mashup art, the compulsory-licensing system needs to offer
reasonably affordable rates for amateurs.
Building on this concept, the licensing system should promote
the legal use of samples by offering a lower rate for excerpts that are
less than a minute in length. For musical compositions, the statutory
rate for physical phonorecords is "9.1 cents per minute of playing time
or fraction thereof, whichever is larger." 27 0

However, many mashup

and remix videos feature multiple different samples of copyrighted
material, but each clip is only seconds long. 2 7 1 A system that uses the
minute as the base measure does not properly account for this art
form, as it quickly leads to unreasonably high costs. Accordingly,
lawmakers need to create a separate and lower standard rate for
samples that are less than a minute. This would also encourage the
clearinghouse to offer licenses for samples of video content. Currently,
HFA directs prospective licensees to obtain sampling permission from
the owner of the master recording and the publisher. 272 In order to
streamline the process of licensing video samples, however, there
needs to be only one source for obtaining authorization: the
video-content clearinghouse.
While such a collective-licensing scheme would undoubtedly
benefit sampling artists, it does cabin the rights of content owners
One possible
more than the traditional system of licensing. 273
objection to this proposal is that it removes content owners' exclusive
right to reject prospective licensees. 274 Moreover, it encroaches on
rightsholders' ability to negotiate with individual users for a higher
royalty rate. 2 7 5

Nevertheless, on balance, compulsory licensing would better
promote the progress of useful arts, in accordance with the principal
goal of copyright law. 2 7 6 The system would foster amateur art forms

See supra Part II.C.
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by providing nonprofessional artists with easy access to licensing.
Additionally, the rightsholders of famous content, who might be
adversely affected by this scheme, would have already monetized their
art in some fashion (otherwise they would not be an attractive target
for sampling); therefore, they are unlikely to suffer a disincentive to
create in the future. Moreover, this arrangement would ultimately
benefit all content owners financially by increasing compliance with
copyright laws. Streamlining the process of obtaining permission and
providing amateur artists with greater access to the system would
encourage current infringers to pursue a legal license, which should
allow content owners to earn royalties on what would otherwise be
unauthorized, infringing uses. Content owners would also be able to
decrease the significant transaction costs associated with bringing
infringement suits. Finally, content owners (particularly large ones)
would greatly improve their standing in the court of public opinion by
providing individuals with a reasonable avenue to license content; this
should (theoretically) allow them to more effectively lobby Congress
for increased copyright protection (and enforcement) in the future.
Therefore, this modified collective-management approach
would best balance the interests of content owners and remix artists,
creating a viable market for video content. By incorporating the three
proposed elements into a compulsory-licensing scheme, lawmakers
would tailor the system to the unique challenges that remix and
mashup videos present. While both this proposal and the Creative
Commons model offer amateur artists greater access to copyrighted
material, the compulsory-licensing system more fully accounts for the
Copyright laws should foster
economic interests of rightsholders.
creativity from a spectrum of artists, not just those with bargaining
power; however, it should also reward those who have made original
works worth copying.
IV. TURNING INFRINGEMENT INTO PROFIT

In the last decade, online-streaming videos have become
"interwoven into the fabric of daily life, politics, and commerce" as a
major mode of creative expression. 277 Moreover, videos have begun to
incorporate the tradition of sampling, as popularized by rap and
hip-hop music. 2 78 Today, both professional and amateur artists often
incorporate copyrighted video content into their creative projects,
breathing new life into existing material. 279 But there is strong
277.
278.
279.
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evidence that noncompliance with video-licensing requirements is a
serious problem, one that educational campaigns and crackdowns on
copyright infringement have not alleviated. 280 This issue arises from
high actual and transactional costs associated with pursuing a license,
as well as the fact that many end-users have substantially less
bargaining power than content owners. 281 Neither Congress nor
current content owners anticipated the growth of an amateur remix
and mashup culture, so the video-licensing system does not account
for amateur artists' needs, philosophies, or social norms.
Given the ineffectiveness of this system in promoting copyright
compliance among amateur artists, it is time for a new licensing
framework-one that both promotes creativity and upholds the profit
interests of content owners. In light of the meaningful distinctions
between professional and amateur artists, it is time to explore
alternative approaches to "one size fits all" licensing. This Note
recommends a compulsory-licensing model, similar to the system that
exists for musical compositions. However, this proposal has three
modifications that would tailor licensing to the unique challenges that
remix and mashup videos present: (1) protection for derivative works,
(2) royalty rates that distinguish between amateur and professional
artists, and (3) reasonable royalty rates for samples.
Rather than creating a war of ideas between content owners
and future users, such a licensing system would encourage them to
benefit from each other. The primary purpose of US copyright law is
to encourage creativity, and it should therefore allow amateur-remix
video art to thrive. As musical artist Ben Folds recently stated,
"Amateurs are the people who are the more talented, more dangerous,
more interesting, more creative." 282 Democratized culture benefits
everyone by fostering creativity at all artistic levels, but copyright law
should evolve as well in order to also achieve a sustainable market.
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